Speech by Premier Ladislav Adamec at an extraordinary session of the CPCz CC, stating his preference for a political solution to the crisis
Annotation
Only days after November 17 a growing number of Czechoslovak communists were becoming convinced that the conservative leadership's hardliner approach to the growing public unrest was failing. This sea change in official opinion began to crystallize on November 24 at the extraordinary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, which foreshadowed the ascendancy of younger functionaries and reformers at the expense of the old conservative leaders. In addition to the removal of a few compromised individuals, the session's public statement reflected a more conciliatory attitude, expressing regret for November 17 and suggesting the possibility of dialogue with the opposition. The meeting's speakers included Federal Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, a reform communist who was the first high-ranking official to make contact with the main opposition group Civic Forum. In this speech, Adamec distanced himself from the discredited conservatives and advocated a "political solution" to the crisis, arguing that communists had to compromise if they wanted to preserve their position. Although reformers ultimately failed to co-opt the popular movement, this new trend in party leadership opened the way for the realization of the round-table negotiations and the peaceful transfer of power from the one-party state.
Text
Prague, November 24, 1989
Speech by Premier Ladislav Adamec at an extraordinary session of the CPCz CC,
stating his preference for a political solution to the crisis (excerpts)
[...] Making decisions is not simple. Events are developing rapidly and aren't the same
everywhere. I therefore regard it as my duty to express my opinion of the situation and its
resolution. I am aware we don't have much choice. The pressure of circumstances is
rising day by day and possibly hour by hour. We have to deal with it. I am considering
the alternatives along with everybody else. There are basically two ways to go - both
have their advantages and drawbacks, merits and risks. None of them are guaranteed to
fully succeed. With these thoughts, following on from what Comrade Jakeš has said, I
would like to contribute to finding the internationally and internally optimum political
variant. To explain the first alternative, let us assume that mass demonstrations and the
spreading strike movements constitute a direct attack on the socialist establishment, and
that therefore there is no other way but to immediately halt all protest actions. On the
basis of this evaluation, we may decide that a general strike must be prevented even at the
cost of extensive use of extraordinary means, including force. This operation could be
complemented by a large number of protest letters from Party collectives in industrial and
agricultural factories and other workplaces. One cannot passively watch the law being
violated. To allow anarchy would be the direct opposite of democracy, whereas taking
extraordinary measures could, if only temporarily, return calm to the streets. But
experience with administrative measures has shown a significant risk. After a certain
period the situation could explode again, bringing on another crisis, with still more
unpredictable results.
For all these reasons, I would clearly prefer the second alternative: a political solution.
We must count on making certain acceptable concessions. I believe that we have not
nearly exhausted these possibilities. I also rely on the fact that most of our people,
including young people, have no reason to be against socialism. They are unsatisfied with
many things, even stirred up by all kinds of disinformation, but are able and willing to
repay trust with trust. To drive the young generation into the arms of the enemies of
socialism would be an unforgivable mistake. This must be prevented under any
circumstances. I also advocate political methods because the recent intervention of the
forces of order has led to the radicalization of youth, allowed the unification of various
groups behind its condemnation, and has not contributed to the authority of either the
Party or the state. Next time we have to avoid things like this. It would also be a mistake
to underestimate the international risks of a broad application of force. We mustn't labor
under the illusion that various democratization, environmental, and other movements end
at our borders. Also, signed international treaties dealing with human rights cannot be
taken lightly. When selecting methods of managing internal political problems, the
international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on. From the
capitalist states, one must take into account the results of a political and economic
boycott. This warning should not be understood as a call for concessions at any price,
without regard to the loss of socialist values.
To look truth in the eye means to realize that the loss of political trust as a result of
mistakes in leadership must be paid for. And there have been many in the last twenty
years, and not small ones. I am convinced, however, that we need not pay too high a price,
if we can manage to mobilize the Party. No one else has such a numerous membership,
such an experienced cadre of functionaries, and close connections with each collective.
[...] Today it has come down to the very status of the Party in society. If our meeting
helps to energize all its members, it will fulfil its historic mission. If not, we shall pay
dearly, and only very slowly repair the damage. I consider it especially important and
sensitive to take a position on the basic demands, especially those most often voiced.
They are extremely varied, correct and incorrect, feasible either now or only later. This
must be clear. Those that we are unable to answer immediately, at least let us say when
we will address them. Under no circumstances should there arise the impression that we
are avoiding something, using delaying tactics, and somehow maneuvering. Let us
choose our course so as not to give impetus to further waves of still-more-radical
demands. I consider it crucial to announce the calling of another meeting of the Central
Committee within a fortnight to evaluate political questions, especially the program of
accelerated restructuring and expanded dialogue. We would gain time, mobilize the Party,
and improve its level of information on the chosen strategy. The Party needs a short-term
action program, a plan for the unification of the greatest possible number of Communists
towards a concrete goal in the upcoming weeks. It would then even be possible to
organize a broad public discussion centered on the positions and proposal of the CC
CPCz. We could also, for example, quickly submit proposals on the constitution for
public discussion, publicize proposed laws on the association and assembly for citizen
comment. This would provide a certain framework and solid content to a thus far less
than constructive exchange of views. We could take the wind out of the sails of the daily
proclamations, various calls, and petitions. I am convinced that only an active approach
can put our side on the initiative, and with this we shall also gain the majority of our
citizens in favor of Party policy. This is the best reply to the demands of Party
organizations for more assistance from the CPCz Central Committee. [...]
Source: Stenographic minutes of the Extraordinary Session of the CC CPCz, November
24, 1989, pp. 21-3, State Central Archive, Prague, CC CPCz record group, W-0154/89.
Translated from the Czech by Todd Hammond.
(From The Democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia: Its Precondition, Course, and
Immediate Repercussions, 1987-89, An International Conference, 14-16 October 1999,
Prague, Briefing Book)
Credits
Ladislav Adamec, "Political Solution to the Crisis", speech, session of the CPCz CC, Prague, November 24, 1989, trans. Todd Hammond, Cold War International History Project, Documents and Papers, CWIHP (accessed May 14, 2008).