The Possible Soviet Intervention in Romania
Annotation
Romanian security forces' violent assault on demonstrators in Timisoara in mid-December 1989 sparked a wave of speculation as to whether this spelled the end of Nicolae Ceausescu, the region's sole remaining communist dictator. Among the rumors circulating was a possible military intervention by the Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries to overthrow Romania's hardliner government. Adopting an increasingly paranoid view of the outside world, the Ceausescu regime took this rumor seriously, as seen in this summary of the December 21 meeting between Romanian ambassador to Moscow Ion Bucur and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister I.P. Aboimov. Although the Soviets officially adopted a policy of non-intervention towards their East European satellites, there was no love lost between the Soviet and Romanian leaders. The decades-long estrangement between Bucharest and Moscow had been exacerbated in the late 1980s by Ceausescu's public rejection of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reformist policies. The tension between the two governments is illustrated by the concerns raised by Bucur about Soviet intervention in Romania. While Aboimov denied the accusations, his careful reply suggests the atmosphere of mistrust and confusion surrounding Romanian-Soviet relations in this critical period.
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Information Note from the Romanian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
21 December 1989, 2:00 pm
Comrade Ion Stoica, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
1. On 21 December 1989, at 12:00 pm, I paid a visit to Deputy Foreign Minister I. P.
Aboimov to whom I presented a copy of the speech given by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu,
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party [PCR] and President of the Socialist
Republic of Romania [SRR], on the 20 December 1989 over radio and television. I. P. Aboimov
made no comments with regard to the speech. He requested that the Soviet side receive
information as to whether,during the events taking place in Timisoara, any deaths had occurred
and what the current situation in the city was.
2. Aboimov said that during the 19 December discussions between the Soviet ambassador
in Bucharest and Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu, the latter expressed his disapproval with the official
declarations made by Soviet officials concerning the events in Timisoara. He [Ceausescu] said
that those [actions taking place in Timisoara] are the result of strategies developed beforehand by
[member nations of] the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). [Ceausescu] suggested that certain
officials in Bucharest told ambassadors from socialist countries that they have information with
respect to the intention of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in Romania.
As for the so-called official declarations [Aboimov added], they probably refer to a reply
made by Cde. E[dward] Shevardnadze, [Soviet] Minister of Foreign Affairs to a question from a
Western journalist during his trip to Brussels. [The question] referred to the events in Timisoara
and [the question of] whether force was used there. Cde. Shevardnadze answered that “I do not
have any knowledge [of this], but if there are casualties, I am distressed.” Aboimov said that, if
indeed there are casualties, he considered [Shevardnadze’s] answer justified. He stressed tha t E.
Shevardnadze made no other specific announcement in Brussels [with regards to the events in
Timisoara]. Concerning the accusations that the actions [in Timisoara] were planned by the
Warsaw Pact, and specifically the declarations with regard to the intentions of the USSR,
Aboimov said that, personally, and in a preliminary fashion, he qualifies the declarations as
“without any base, not resembling reality and apt to give rise to suspicion. It is impossible that
anybody will believe such accusations. Such accusations”— Aboimov went on to say— “have
such grave repercussions that they necessitate close investigation.”
He stressed that the basis of interaction between the USSR and other governments rested
on the principles of complete equality among states, mutual respect, and non-intervention in
internal affairs.
(ss) [Ambassador] Ion Bucur
[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs— Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
(AMAE), Moscow/1989, vol. 10, pp. 303-304. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu. ]
Credits
Ion Bucur to Ion Stoica, 21 December 1989, trans. Mircea Munteanu, Cold War International History Project, Documents and Papers, CWIHP (accessed May 14, 2008).