

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

29 October 1981

Cde. L. I. BREZHNEV presiding.

Also taking part: Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, A. A. Gromyko,
A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov,
D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev,
V. V. Kuznetsov, B. N. Ponomarev, I. V. Kapitonov,
M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov

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2. On the Results of Cde. K. V. Rusakov's Trip to the GDR, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Bulgaria

BREZHNEV. It's known to all those here that at the instruction of the CPSU CC Politburo, Cde. Rusakov traveled to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria to inform our friends about several matters, in particular about the measures we have adopted and will be adopting in connection with the Polish events.

Cde. Rusakov completed his travel to these countries and informed the Politburo about the results of the trip in a note, which you now have.¹

Perhaps Konstantin Viktorovich has something to add to what he has written in the note. If so, then by all means.

RUSAKOV. I spoke with the leaders of the four fraternal states, as I was instructed by the Politburo. The negotiations concerned two matters: The first was the question of Poland. The note describes in detail my discussions with the leaders of the fraternal countries on the Polish question. I can attest that all the leaders of the fraternal parties are in complete agreement with us on the measures we have adopted toward Poland, and also toward the situation now unfolding in Poland. In short, I can say that on this point there is complete unity of views.

¹ Translator's Note: A draft of the report is stored in the former CPSU Central Committee General Department archive, "TsK KPSS: Spravka ob itogakh poezdki v ChSSR, VNR, BNR, i GDR," 27 October 1981 (Top Secret), from K. V. Rusakov to the CPSU Politburo, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 603, Ll. 117-126.

During the negotiations, the leaders of the fraternal countries also raised economic questions. Chief among these was the question about reducing supplies of energy, above all oil.² Although Cdes. Kadar, Husak, and Zhivkov said that this would be difficult for them, all of them reacted with understanding to our proposal and our request, and said that they will find a way to cope with the situation and go along with what we proposed. To ensure that the matter was fully clarified, I asked each of the comrades the following question: Can I report to the Politburo that you agree with the point of view I expressed? The comrades responded that, yes, I could say that.

My conversation with Cde. Honecker, though, was different.³ He immediately said that the GDR could not accept such a reduction in the supply of oil, that this would cause serious damage to the national economy and the GDR as a whole, that this would strike a heavy blow at the GDR's economy, and that we shouldn't proceed with it. He even declared that they simply cannot put up with it, and requested a written response from Cde. Brezhnev to two letters that they sent. Thus, the question proved to be very contentious, and it essentially was left unresolved. Cde. Honecker again cited as evidence the fact that they were supplying us with bismuth⁴ and uranium, that they are providing upkeep for the Group of [Soviet] Forces, and that matters are especially complicated for them because the Polish People's Republic is not supplying the coal that we [East Germans] need. According to Honecker, this has led to a sharp decline in the living standards of the German population, and we [East Germans] don't know how we should explain it. They will have to reexamine all the preliminary drafts of their five-year plan.

BREZHNEV. I think we should approve the discussions that Cde. Rusakov had with Cdes. Honecker, Husak, Kadar, and Zhivkov. In our practical work in the future we should take account of the ideas expressed by the comrades about the Polish question.

² Translator's Note: On 28 November 1980, the CPSU Politburo decided (in P227/21) to reduce oil shipments to Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia in order to provide at least 465 million dollars' worth of additional aid to Poland. See "Spravka o sovetskoi pomoshchi PNR v svobodno konvertiruemoi valyute v 1980-1981 gg.," L. 2. In 1982 the Soviet Union imposed a further 10 percent across-the-board reduction in its deliveries of energy supplies to CMEA countries at intra-CMEA prices. (Intra-CMEA prices were based on a five-year sliding scale of world prices.) This latter cut was motivated primarily by a desire to earn increased hard currency from exports to Western countries, which grew by roughly 40 percent in 1982. For an analysis of the considerations that led to this abrupt change in Soviet-East European energy relations, see John P. Hardt, "Soviet Energy Policy in Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 189-220.

³ Translator's Note: For the top-secret East German transcript of this discussion, see "Niederschrift uber das Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der SED, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit dem Sekretär des ZK der KPdSU, Genossen Konstantin Viktorovic Rusakov, am 21. Oktober 1981," in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2/A-2431; reprinted in Wilke *et al.*, eds., *Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen*", pp. 377-382.

⁴ Translator's Note: The transcript gives the Russian word "vismut" here, which would be translated in English as bismuth. However, it is possible that some confusion arose on the part of either the stenographer or Rusakov, and that Honecker actually had been referring to Wismut, the huge uranium mining complex in the Thuringian and Saxony regions of East Germany, which had been a vital source of uranium for the Soviet Union since the mid-1940s. The Wismut complex remained in operation until Germany was reunified in 1990.

As you know, we decided to reduce the supply of oil to our friends. All of them believed this would be onerous for them, and even now Cde. Honecker, for example, as you can see, is awaiting a response to the letters he sent us. The others are not awaiting a response, but deep down they naturally are hoping that we will somehow change our decision.

Perhaps it would be worthwhile at the next meeting with our friends to say, somehow, on this matter that we will be taking all measures needed to fulfill and overfulfill the plan on oil, and that we hope we will succeed. If so, we could make adjustments in the planned deliveries of energy supplies, though we should say this of course without letting them think that we are now backing away from our decision.

Obviously, Cde. Tikhonov must again closely examine this question and, if the slightest opportunity arises to alleviate matters, he should submit appropriate recommendations to the CC.

GROMYKO. With regard to Poland, I would like to say that I just had a conversation with the ambassador, Cde. Aristov. He informed me that the one-hour strike was highly instructive.⁵ At many enterprises Solidarity has essentially taken over. Even those who want to work are unable to do so, because the Solidarity extremists are preventing them from working, threatening them in all possible ways, etc.

With regard to the plenum, Cde. Aristov reported that it proceeded normally and that they chose two additional Secretaries.⁶ At the Sejm, which opens on 30 October, they will be considering limitations on strikes. What this law will consist of is still difficult to say, but in any event at least attempts are being made to limit strikes by means of the law.⁷ Cde. Jaruzelski's speech at the plenum, I'd say, wasn't bad.

⁵ Translator's Note: The one-hour strike to which Gromyko is referring was held on 28 October, the day before this CPSU Politburo meeting. In September and October, differences between Solidarity and the government had been growing on a number of issues, especially on the question of food supplies and public control over economic activities. When the government declined to hold meaningful negotiations to resolve these differences, Solidarity's National Commission voted on 23 October to hold a one-hour strike on the 28th. The strike was observed all around the country, despite Jaruzelski's claims to the contrary.

⁶ Translator's Note: Gromyko is referring to the PZPR Central Committee's Fifth Plenum, held on 27-28 October 1981. This plenum was largely uneventful, voting mainly to continue the policies outlined at the Fourth Plenum ten days earlier. The Fourth Plenum was marked by vehement criticism of the Party leadership, culminating in Kania's decision to step down as First Secretary. Jaruzelski was chosen to succeed Kania by a vote of 180 to 4. In a closing resolution, the Fourth Plenum called for an end to strikes, voiced further criticism of the Party leadership, attacked Solidarity for its alleged violations of earlier agreements, demanded an end to "anti-Soviet propaganda" and a rebuff to antisocialist forces, approved the use of "full constitutional powers" to safeguard vital state interests, and designated several officials to prepare a long-range Party program. All these points were reaffirmed at the Fifth Plenum. The two new Secretaries chosen at the Fifth Plenum were Włodzimierz Mokrzyński (a candidate member of the PZPR Politburo and first secretary of the PZPR's Olsztyn committee) and Marian Orzechowski (from Wrocław University). The plenum also appointed General Florian Siwicki, the chief of the Polish General Staff, to be a candidate member of the PZPR Politburo.

⁷ Translator's Note: In a speech to the Sejm on 30 October, Jaruzelski called for an outright ban on strikes and demanded "extraordinary powers" to defend state interests. On neither point did the parliament grant his requests. By a unanimous vote, the Sejm merely adopted a resolution appealing for an end to strikes

BREZHNEV. I don't believe that Cde. Jaruzelski did anything constructive. It seems to me that he is not a brave enough man.⁸

ANDROPOV. Jaruzelski essentially has done nothing new, even though a good deal of time has already elapsed. Barcikowski and Kubiak pose a big obstacle within the Politburo.⁹ There were discussions about this and advice was given to remove Barcikowski and Kubiak from the Politburo. However, Jaruzelski effectively refused to take this measure. He explains his inaction by saying that he has no cadres available to replace these people.

(but not prohibiting them) and indicating that "further consideration" would be given to legal measures "appropriate to the situation."

⁸ Translator's Note: The complaints voiced at this meeting about Jaruzelski, whose tenure as PZPR First Secretary had barely begun, reflected the growing impatience in Moscow after expectations had been briefly raised by the removal of Kania. A congratulatory telephone call by Brezhnev to Jaruzelski on 19 October made clear that Soviet leaders had supported Jaruzelski for the top party post and expected him to move swiftly in "overcoming the severe ailments that afflict your country" and to "take decisive measures against the counterrevolution." Jaruzelski, for his part, said "I want to tell you [Brezhnev] frankly that I had some inner misgivings about accepting this post and agreed to do so only because I knew that you support me and that you were in favor of this decision. If this had not been so, I never would have agreed to it." Quoted from "Zapis' telefonnogo razgovora tov. L. I. Brezhneva s tov. V. Yaruzel'skim," No. P1942 (Secret), 19 October 1981, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 4, Ll. 2-5. A few weeks later, Brezhnev was much more disappointed when he emphasized to Jaruzelski that "we greeted your election as PZPR Central Committee First Secretary with great hope" and had seen "a direct link between the change of the First Secretary and the need for urgent measures to salvage socialism in Poland." Brezhnev said the CPSU Politburo was "aware that, at earlier stages of the struggle against the anti-socialist forces, you [Jaruzelski] were inhibited by the political indecisiveness of the party leadership [i.e., Kania]," and that Soviet officials had thought "this obstacle has finally been eliminated. . . . However, one gets the impression that a turnaround on this matter has not yet been achieved. The anti-socialist forces not only are gaining sway in many large industrial enterprises, but are also continuing to spread their influence among ever wider segments of the population. . . . The direct consequence of this hostile activity is a dangerous increase in anti-Sovietism in Poland." Brezhnev urged Jaruzelski to "resist the entreaties of those who want to continue the bankrupt course of Kania" and warned him "not to make any further concessions to the enemies of socialism." The Soviet leader called, once again, for "decisive actions against the sworn enemies of the people's order [and] an attack against the class enemy." Quoted from "Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Polibyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda: O prieme v SSSR partiinogosudarstvennoi delegatsii PNR i ustnom poslanii t. Brezhneva L. I. t. V. Yaruzel'skomu," No. P37/21 (Top Secret), 21 November 1981, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 5, Ll. 1-6. Hardline members of the PZPR Central Committee were voicing similar criticisms of Jaruzelski at this time. In a conversation with Soviet officials on 28 November 1981, Zdzislaw Drewniowski lamented that "the whole party and the entire nation had expected decisive measures from General W. Jaruzelski. Initially, our enemies feared him. But now it's obvious to everyone that in reality General W. Jaruzelski has turned out not to be a military commander-in-chief. Instead, he is the 'conciliator-in-chief' with the vile class enemies and views all the Polish troubles through the prism of his 'dark glasses.' It is not clear that W. Jaruzelski will firmly press the issue of defending socialism in the PPR. This has prompted our enemies to engage in outrageous actions without letup." Quoted from "O nekotorykh sobytiyakh v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," Ll. 38-39.

⁹ Translator's Note: Soviet leaders had long viewed Barcikowski and Kubiak with suspicion, believing that they were too inclined to seek a compromise with Solidarity. Honecker viewed Kubiak with even greater mistrust, claiming that he was a furtive supporter of KOR.

There is a good deal of controversy about who will be the premier of Poland.¹⁰ Jaruzelski clearly is inclined to go with Olszowski and Rakowski. It's not possible, of course, for both of them to become premiers.

BREZHNEV. Schmidt even in one of the discussions blurted out that a very dangerous situation is emerging in Poland, and that this situation might complicate and affect my visit to the FRG, which might have to be called off.¹¹

ANDROPOV. The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line — that our troops will not be sent to Poland.

USTINOV. In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our troops to Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops. Right now in Poland a demobilization is under way of those whose terms of service have ended. The demobilized troops are sent home so that they can get their civilian clothes, and then they come back fresh and serve another two months.¹² But at this time they are susceptible to influence from "Solidarity." Jaruzelski, as we know, has organized a number of operational groups consisting of roughly three people each.¹³ But these groups so far

¹⁰ Translator's Note: For the time being, Jaruzelski was combining the posts of prime minister, PZPR First Secretary, and national defense minister. There were rumors in October 1981 that he might relinquish one or both of his ministerial positions, but those rumors proved to be unfounded. Jaruzelski continued to serve in all three capacities even after he took on additional duties as head of the Military Council for National Salvation (the chief martial-law organ) in December 1981.

¹¹ Translator's Note: Brezhnev was due to leave for a 4-day trip to West Germany on 22 November. Despite the concerns he expressed here, the visit went off as planned, and it ended up focusing mainly on the prospects for limits on NATO and Warsaw Pact intermediate-range nuclear forces. See the secret report on the visit, distributed to all CPSU organizations in late November 1981, "Ob itogakh vizita General'nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS, Predsedatelya Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva v FRG," 26 November 1981 (Secret) and the report prepared for the CPSU Politburo on party members' reactions to the visit, "Ob otklikah trudyashchikhsya na itogi vizita General'nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS, Predsedatelya Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva v FRG," No. P2199 (Top Secret), 26 November 1981, as well as Memorandum No. 41189 and 41237 (Secret) from E. Razumov, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational-Party Work Department, 30 December 1981, all in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 76, Ll. 78-85. For the press coverage, see "Sovmestnoe kommyunike o prebyvanii General'nogo Sekretarya TsK KPSS, Predsedatelya Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR L. I. Brezhneva v Federativnoi Respublike Germanii" and "V interesakh mira i sotrudnichestva," both in *Pravda* (Moscow), 26 November 1981, pp. 1-2 and 2, respectively. See also the front-page coverage in *Pravda* on 24 and 25 November under the rubric "Vizit v Federativnyu Respubliku Germanii," which made no mention of the Polish crisis.

¹² Translator's Note: This was a special arrangement devised by Jaruzelski in the leadup to martial law. Normally, Polish soldiers were required to serve only two years. But Jaruzelski knew that troops entering the army in the autumn of 1981 would have been exposed to Solidarity's influence for more than a year. Hence, in October 1981 the Polish leader ordered a two-month extension of service for soldiers whose two-year conscription period was about to end. This measure did not eliminate serious doubts about the viability of using conscripts to enforce martial law, but it did prevent a much worse situation from developing in the army and ensured that, at the very least, the army would not obstruct the introduction of martial law.

¹³ Translator's Note: Ustinov is referring here to a step taken by Jaruzelski in late October after consulting with other members of the Polish National Defense Ministry's Military Council. Some 2,000 "local operational groups" (*terenowe grupy operacyjne*, or TGO), each consisting of four to six soldiers and non-

haven't done anything. Obviously we need a meeting with the leadership of Poland, in particular with Jaruzelski. But who should take part in the meeting is a different matter.

RUSAKOV. Tomorrow the Sejm opens, where the question will be taken up about granting the government extraordinary powers to decide a number of matters. Jaruzelski, I might add, would like to come to Moscow. In that regard, we must prepare well for it.

BREZHNEV. And who will prepare material for conversations with Jaruzelski?

RUSAKOV. I think the Commission on Poland should be instructed to prepare material for a possible discussion with Jaruzelski, if he so wishes.¹⁴

BREZHNEV. Did we send to Poland the meat we decided on, and did we tell Jaruzelski about it?

RUSAKOV. We told Jaruzelski about this; he cited a figure of 30 thousand tons.¹⁵

ARKHIPOV. We will be sending the meat to Poland from our state reserves.

BREZHNEV. Have there been any sorts of improvements in the receipt of meat in

commissioned officers whose tours of duty had just been extended, were sent to villages and towns around the country, where they established links with official youth organizations, veterans' organizations, and paramilitary units. Their proclaimed tasks were to assess "all negative developments," to "facilitate supply lines between the towns and rural areas," and to "support the mechanism of food shipment." In the process they were supposed to help maintain public order, eliminate waste and bottlenecks, and gather detailed information about local conditions, which proved valuable for the martial law operation. See "Terenowe grupy operacyjne przystąpiły do pracy," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 27 October 1981, p. 1. On the Military Council's session, see "Posiedzenie Rady Wojskowej MON," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 20 October 1981, p. 1. The military operational groups were withdrawn from the countryside in late November, ostensibly having achieved their mission. But shortly thereafter, similar groups were sent to large enterprises in urban areas. It is now clear that both sets of operational groups were intended primarily to aid the final preparations for martial law, especially through the gathering of intelligence. See, for example, the comments of General Florian Siwicki, the chief of the Polish General Staff, in "Protokół Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.," 5 December 1981 (Secret), reprinted in Wlodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, p. 555. It is also now clear that Soviet officials had been promoting the deployment of TGOs; see, for example, the top-secret cable from B. Aristov, the Soviet ambassador in Poland, to the CPSU Secretariat, 18 November 1981, transmitting documents pertaining to the TGOs, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 24-28.

¹⁴ Translator's Note: It turned out that Jaruzelski did not end up coming to Moscow, but an important delegation of Soviet military and KGB officers visited Warsaw on 24-25 November 1981. See "W. Jaruzelski przyjął A. Kulikowa i A. Gribkowa," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 25 November 1981, p. 1. The delegation, headed by Marshal Kulikov and General Gribkov, closely inspected all the documents and preparations for the martial law operation, which had been hastily revised in the wake of Kuklinski's defection to the West on 7 November. The finishing touches were then put on the plans, and the necessary equipment and directives were distributed. By the time Kulikov left Warsaw on 25 November to brief Marshal Ustinov, the martial law crackdown was ready to be implemented.

¹⁵ Translator's Note: Five days later, on 3 November 1981, Soviet and Polish foreign trade officials signed a contract for the prompt delivery of 30,000 tons of beef and pork to Poland. The meat was to be shipped in several installments in November and December. See the further discussion of the promised shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat at the 10 December 1981 meeting of the CPSU Politburo.

the union fund from the republics since I sent out my telegram?

ARKHIPOV. So far, Leonid Il'ich, there have been no improvements at all in the receipt of meat. True, not much time has passed yet. But I've spoken with all the republics and can report that everywhere measures are being taken to permit fulfillment of the planned deliveries of meat to the state. In particular, such measures have been worked out in Estonia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. The Ukrainians so far have not issued instructions to the provinces.

CHERNENKO. But we distributed our telegram to all the provinces in Ukraine.

ARKHIPOV. We'll have further data on Monday, and then we'll report where matters stand.

GORBACHEV. Leonid Il'ich, your telegram played a big role. Above all, the republics and provinces are all seriously considering measures to ensure that the plan is fulfilled. In any event, according to data that we have as a result of telephone conversations with the provincial committees, territorial committees, and CCs of the union-republic Communist Parties, this question is under scrutiny everywhere. On 1 January, we'll provide a report on the collection of meat.

BREZHNEV. I still think that although we gave 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, our meat will scarcely be of help to the Poles. In any event, there is still no clear indication of what will happen with Poland in the future. Cde. Jaruzelski is not showing any sign of initiative. Perhaps we should prepare for a discussion with him.

As far as the discussions about the supply of oil are concerned, I'm especially worried about the GDR. In general I would say that the socialist countries are taking our proposal hard. Even if they don't say so directly, they are disgruntled about our decision. And some, as Cde. Rusakov indicated in his statement, are openly expressing dissatisfaction. Cde. Honecker is especially dissatisfied. He openly says that this decision is unacceptable for them, and he even is requesting a written response. What sort of decision we'll adopt about this, I simply don't know.

ANDROPOV, SUSLOV, and KIRILENKO say they must agree with what you have just said.

ARKHIPOV. We have further difficulties with fuel. The coal miners will fall short by 30 million tons of coal. How can we make up for it? The oil industry is not going to exceed its plan, which means we'll have to make up for these 30 million tons in some other way. Moreover, we're in need of 1.5 million tons of sugar and will have to buy it, and we also need 800 thousand tons of vegetable oil, which it will be impossible to do without.

As far as the response to Cde. Honecker is concerned, I think the recommendation offered by Cde. Rusakov is correct. We must emphasize that we cannot change the

decision we conveyed to Cde. Honecker.

With regard to the delivery of uranium that Cde. Honecker mentioned, this uranium from the GDR does not solve any problems. It consists of only 20 percent of the total quantity of uranium we use.¹⁶ Cde. Honecker also neglects to take account of the fact that we are building nuclear plants for the GDR.¹⁷ This is a big undertaking.

RUSAKOV. I also want to say that the Poles are requesting us to preserve the level of oil and gas we supplied this year.

ARKHIPOV. We're holding negotiations with the Poles about this, and we believe

¹⁶ Translator's Note: By the early 1980s the Soviet Union was using 16,000-17,000 metric tons of uranium a year, of which roughly 3,300-3,500 tons came from the GDR. Recent studies, based on newly available materials in the former GDR, suggest that between 1947 and 1990, one-third of the uranium consumed by the Soviet nuclear industry (for both weapons and power generation) was obtained from the huge Wismut mining complex in the Saxony and Thuringian regions of eastern Germany. The shipment of this uranium was mandated under an agreement signed by the Soviet government and by German authorities in the Soviet Occupation Zone in 1946. (In subsequent years, the agreement was updated and renewed.) In the late 1940s, the fledgling Soviet nuclear weapons industry was heavily dependent on imports of uranium from Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany. Over the next few decades, as domestic production of uranium in the Soviet Union steadily increased, and as additional supplies became available in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Mongolia as well as Czechoslovakia, the share of uranium from the GDR diminished as a percentage of the Soviet Union's total consumption. (In absolute terms, however, the amount from the GDR remained very high. The GDR's share of the total declined only because Soviet consumption increased sharply between the mid-1940s and early 1980s.) Even at the lower level in 1981 of roughly 20 percent of total Soviet consumption, uranium exports from East Germany were of great significance to the Soviet economy. For further information about the Soviet-East German uranium relationship and the Wismut complex, see Reimar Paul, *Das Wismut Erbe: Geschichte und Folgen des Uranbergbaus in Thuringen und Sachsen* (Gottingen: Verlag Die Werkstatt, 1991); Rainer Karlsch, "Der Aufbau der Uranindustrien in der SBZ/DDR und CSR als Folge der sowjetischen 'Uranlucke'," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* (Berlin), Vol. 44, No. 1 (1996), pp. 5-24; Rainer Karlsch, "'Ein Staat im Staate': Der Uranbergbau der Wismut AG in Sachsen und Thuringen," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Bonn), No. 49-50/93 (3 December 1993), pp. 14-23; *Seilfahrt— Auf den Spuren des sächsischen Uranerzbergbaus* (Haltern: Bode Verlag, 1990); *Vor Ort—Der Uranerzbergbau in Thuringen* (Haltern: Bode Verlag, 1998); Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, *Die sowjetische Atombombe*, Working Paper No. 40 (Berlin: Berghof-Stiftung für Konfliktforschung, 1990), pp. 50-51; and Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, *Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 176-178. Two other sources that focus on the early years of the relationship are Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 235-250; and Jonathan E. Helmreich, *Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943-1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 42-75.

¹⁷ Translator's Note: East Germany's nuclear power program, which accounted for 12 percent of the country's electricity in 1981, was based exclusively on Soviet designs and equipment. An initial small reactor had come on line at Rheinsburg in 1966, and another four 400-megawatt reactors were supplied by the Soviet Union for the Bruno Leuschner plant near Griefswald. The Soviet Union also was building two 1,000-megawatt reactors for the GDR at Stendal. (The four 440-megawatt reactors under construction at East Germany's Nord plant in the 1980s were due to be supplied by Czechoslovakia, which was the only CMEA country other than the USSR that was authorized to produce Soviet-designed reactors.) In addition, the GDR was one of several East European countries involved in a joint project to build a massive nuclear power station at Konstantinovka in the western USSR, which would be intended to supply electricity to the states that invested in the project. See Cam Hudson, "CMEA Joint Investments in Soviet Nuclear Power Stations," RAD Background Report No. 11 (Eastern Europe), Radio Free Europe Research, 20 January 1981.

we should base our economic relations with them on the principle of the balancing of plans. Of course that will lead to a significant reduction in the delivery of oil insofar as they do not supply coal and other goods to us.¹⁸ However, if everything is okay, we will set the deliveries at the same volume they are now.

BAIBAKOV. All the socialist countries are trying to feel us out. They're paying close attention to the GDR, watching how we act *vis-a-vis* the GDR. If Honecker succeeds in breaching our resolve, then they, too, will try the same. In any event no one has yet given a written response. I recently spoke with officials from the state planning agencies of all the socialist countries. All of them want to preserve the general quantity of deliveries of oil as planned for coming years. Some propose that other energy sources be substituted for oil.

* * *

A decision is adopted:

1. To approve the discussions held by Cde. K. V. Rusakov with Cdes. Honecker, Husak, Kadar, and Zhivkov.
2. To request the Politburo's Commission on Poland to prepare necessary materials for a possible discussion with Cde. Jaruzelski.
3. To instruct Cdes. Tikhonov, Rusakov, and Baibakov to give additional attention to the question of oil deliveries to these countries, taking account of the exchange of views at the session of the CC Politburo.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48*]

¹⁸ Translator's Note: When the deputy head of the Polish state planning commission, Stanislaw Dlugosz, traveled to Moscow in early September 1981, Soviet officials had made clear to him that they wanted to shift Soviet-Polish economic relations to the "full balancing of payments." (See my penultimate annotation to Notes from Brezhnev's Meeting with Stanislaw Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski, 22 August 1981.) This approach, if implemented, would have been similar to the tactics adopted by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, which had curtailed their economic ties with Poland after the Poles failed to provide scheduled deliveries of coal. See "Vneshnyaya politika PNR na nyneshnem etape (Politpis'mo)," Report No. 595 (Top Secret), 9 July 1981, from B. Aristov to the CPSU Politburo, in *TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34*. For the Polish economy, however, the Soviet Union was far more important than any of the other CMEA states were. In particular, Soviet energy shipments were critical for Poland. Despite serious constraints on the USSR's own economy, Soviet leaders eventually agreed not to insist on a far-reaching adjustment of the balance of payments for Poland. Soviet oil deliveries to Poland remained at roughly the same level even after sharp cuts had been implemented in Soviet deliveries to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.