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CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 22357 01 OF 03 1617502 ACTION SS-00

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O 161736Z AUG 89
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4514
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 22357

DECAPTIONED

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PL, US, UR
SUBJECT: IF SOLIDARITY TAKES CHARGE,
WHAT WILL THE SOVIETS DO?

REFS: A. STATE 257706, B. STATE 258832,
- C. WARSAW 10854

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE POLISH POLITICAL CRISIS HAS BEEN RESTRAINED. OVER THE PAST WEEK, SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE POLISH CABINET CRISIS HAVE BEEN SPARING AND SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. MFA SOURCES STRESS THE DOMESTIC NATURE OF THE ISSUE AND THE USSR'S POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION. SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARY HAS PRESENTED A MIXED PICTURE. STRAIGHT REPORTING OF THE UNFOLDING EVENTS IN WARSAW HAS ALTERNATED WITH HEAVY CRITICISM OF SOLIDARITY AND WALESA (PRAVDA, AUGUST 14), AS WELL AS MODERATE PRAISE (NOVOYE VREMYA, ISSUE NUMBER 34). ONE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 22357 01 OF 03 161750Z

IZVESTIYA ARTICLE HAS ALSO HIGHLIGHTED CURRENT POLISH ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS WE HAVE TALKED WITH BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACQUIESCE TO A SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT. THIS OPINION IS SHARED BY THE OUTGOING POLISH AMBASSADOR.

3. ON BALANCE, WE AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, BARRING A MAJOR MISSTEP BY SOLIDARITY. IN KEEPING WITH SOVIET "NEW THINKING" IN FOREIGN POLICY, A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN DATE/CASE ID: 1 APR 1999 199702122

PageUNCLASSIFIED

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CHANNEL: n/a

1237

STRONG REACTION TO POLISH EVENTS, WHETHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR MILITARY, IS SIMPLY NOT APPROPRIATE. FOR MORE OLD-LINE THINKERS, THE PROSPECT OF A SOLIDARITY TAKEOVER IS NOT SOMETHING THEY ARE COMFORTABLE THINKING ABOUT, OR COMMENTING ON. MOST OF THE LATTER APPEAR TO BE HOLDING THEIR BREATH, OR AT LEAST THEIR RHETORIC, IN HOPES THAT SOMEHOW A SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND INTERNALLY THAT WILL ALLOW THE PZPR TO CONTINUE AS THE LEADING MEMBER OF THE NEXT COALITION GOVERNMENT. WHAT THE SOVIETS MOST WANT TO PROMOTE IN POLAND IS STABILITY AND WHAT THEY MOST WANT TO AVOID IS AN OUTBURST OF ANTI-SOVIET EMOTION. IF SOLIDARITY CAN DELIVER ON THESE ISSUES, THE SOVIETS UNDER GORBACHEV WILL ADAPT, ALBEIT PERHAPS WITH RELUCTANCE, TO THE NEW ORDER.

END SUMMARY

SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENTS: SPARING AD AMBIGUOUS

4. THE CLOSEST THING TO AN OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 22357 01 OF 03 161750Z

ON THE CURRENT CABINET CRISIS IN POLAND WAS GIVEN AT THE FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, MFA PRESS BRIEFING BY DEPUTY SPOKESMAN VADIM PERFIL'YEV, WHO SAID THAT "ATTEMPTS TO USE THE PROCESS OF FORMING A POLISH GOVERNMENT TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY AND DAMAGE ITS ALLIED OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE WARSAW TREATY AND SOVIET-POLISH COOPERATION, WOULD UNDERMINE EUROPEAN STABILITY." THIS LINE WAS REPEATED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN ON AUGUST 13 DURING HIS APPEARANCE ON THE "INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS' ROUNDTABLE".

5. GORAL'D NIKOLAYEVICH GORINOVICH, CHIEF OF THE MFA'S SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF EUROPE ADMINISTRATION, EVINCED QUIET CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN POLAND IN MEETING WITH POLCOUNS ON AUGUST 16 -- AND DUCKED A DIRECT QUESTION ABOUT HOW THE SOIVETS WOULD VIEW A WALESA GOVERNMENT. GORINOVICH INDICATED THE SOVIETS WERE NOT AWARE YET OF ANY REACTION ON ZSL LEADER ROMAN MALINOWSKI'S PART TO GENERAL KISZCZAK'S REQUEST THAT HE FORM A GOVERNMENT. NEITHER THE PZPR NOR SOLIDARITY HAD THE SUPPORT NECESSARY TO UNILATERALLY FORM A GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, AND IN THIS SITUATION MALINOWSKI WAS "NOT A BAD CADIDATE". THE SOVIET UNION'S "CARDINAL PREMISE" IN THE POLISH SITUATION, GORINOVICH ASSERTED, WAS THAT THE MATTER WAS POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. IN GENERAL, THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CHANNEL: n/a

1237

THE FORMATION OF A "WIDE COALITION" GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD INCLUDE ALL THE PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THE SEJM. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, HAD LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 22357 02 OF 03 161750Z ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W

O 161736Z AUG.89 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4515 INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 22357

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PL, US, UR SUBJECT: IF SOLIDARITY TAKES CHARGE,

EFFORTS TO PUT FORWARD "ULTIMATUMS", OR FOR
"POLITICAL STRIKES" WHICH WERE NOT IN THE SPIRIT OF
THE ROUND TABLE AGREEMENT AND ONLY LED TO
CONFRONTATION. A "REASONABLE COMPROMISE" WAS NEEDED
THAT COULD INCLUDE ALL THE POLITICAL FORCES IN THE
COUNTRY. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LECH
WALESA GOVERNMENT, GORINOVICH PAUSED. THE SOVIETS
COULD NOT DENY THAT SOLIDARITY HAD BROAD SUPPORT, HE
SAID, BUT HE WENT ON TO QUESTION SOLIDARITY'S
QUALIFICATIONS TO RULE AFTER HAVING ONLY SERVED AS AN
OPPOSITION FORCE. HE TOOK THE LINE THAT IT WAS EASY
TO CRITICIZE, MUCH HARDER TO ACTUALLY GOVERN "GIVEN
SOLIDARITY'S LACK OF A CONCRETE PROGRAM". THE

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CHANNEL: n/a

1237

SOVIETS PREFERRED NOT TO DEAL IN "HYPOTHETICALS" AT THIS POINT, HE CONCLUDED.

SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARY: A MIXED PICTURE

6. SOVIET PRESS REPORTING ON THE POLISH EVENTS HAS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

MOSCOW 22357 02 OF 03 161750Z

BY AND LARGE BEEN STRAIGHT, TO THE POINT AND FACTUAL. THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECULATION WHATSOEVER CONCERNING SOVIET REACTIONS SHOULD A SOLIDARITY-LED COALITION COME TO POWER IN WARSAW, ALTHOUGH POLISH VULNERABILITIES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCERNS HAVE BEEN OUTLINED. THE MOST CRITICAL ARTICLE ON WALESA AND SOLIDARITY APPEARED IN THE MONDAY, AUGUST 14, EDITION OF PRAVDA. AUTHORED BY TASS CORRESPONDENT "V. VOLKOV" THE ARTICLE LABELLED WALESA'S RECENT ACTIONS AS "AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND POSSIBLY LEADING TO "A PROLONGED POLITICAL CRISIS" IN POLAND. VOLKOV ALSO STATED THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE POLISH ECONOMY WAS BESET WITH PROBLEMS AND IT WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT THAT "A GOVERNMENT BE CREATED WHICH HAD AUTHORITY".... "THE OPPOSITION HAS CHANGED ITS STRATEGY AND ADOPTED A COURSE AIMED AT QUICKLY TAKING POWER". THIS ARTICLE HAS GENERALLY BEEN INTERPRETED BY WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS AS PERHAPS MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN IS WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM IS AN AS YET UNPUBLISHED ARTICLE (IT WILL APPEAR IN ISSUE NUMBER 34 OF NOVOYE VREMYA), WHICH FEATURES AN INTERVIEW OF WALESA IN GDANSK ON AUGUST 15. IN THE ARTICLE, REPORTER VLADIMIR KULISTIKOV QUOTES WALESA AS SAYING "I AM NOT AGAINST THE PARTY (PZRP). I AM AGAINST ANY SORT OF MONOPOLY ON POWER." ACCORDING TO KULISTIKOV, WALESA CONTENDS THAT THE PZRP FIRST BROKE THE SPIRIT OF THE ROUND TABLE AGREEMENT BY ATTEMPTING TO NAME ONLY COMMUNISTS TO RULING POSTS. KULISTIKOV CONCLUDES THAT "IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HE (WALESA) HAS MADE A CHOICE IN FAVOR OF NON-VIOLENCE AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

MOSCOW 22357 02 OF 03 161750Z

STABILITY."

8. AS THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO USED THE PRESS TO POINT OUT POLAND'S

CONFIDENTIAL

Date Printed: 08/26/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 89MOSCOW22357

CHANNEL: n/a

1237

CRITICAL ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVAN ABOIMOV, WHO CARRIES RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MFA FOR RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE, GAVE A LONG INTERVIEW IN THE AUGUST 12 EDITION OF IZVESTIYA ON POLISH-SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION, IN WHICH HE STRESSED POLAND'S HEAVY RELIANCE ON THE USSR FOR RAW MATERIALS AND EASY CREDIT TERMS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE NOTED, THE SOVIET UNION SUPPLIES 85 PERCENT OF POLAND'S OIL IMPORTS, 65 PERCENT OF ITS IRON ORE IMPORTS, AND 50 PERCENT OF COTTON IMPORTS. ABOIMOV ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD RELAXED THE PAYMENT SCHEDULE ON POLAND'S SIX BILLION RUBLE DEBT, AND NOTED IN PASSING THAT DURING THE PERIOD OF U.S. SANCTIONS, WHICH HAD COST POLAND 13-15 BILLION DOLLARS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN POLAND'S ECONOMIC MAINSTAY.

PERSONAL OPINIONS: THE SOVIETS WILL NOT INTERVENE

9. SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS WE HAVE CONTACTED ARE OF THE OPINION THAT, SHOULD A SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT COME TO POWER, SOVIET REACTIONS WILL BE MODERATE. RISO BAJALSKI, A LONGTIME OBSERVER OF THE SOVIET SCENE AND CORRESPONDENT FOR THE YUGOSLAV DAILY "POLITIKA",

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 22357 03 OF 03 1617502 ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W

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CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 22357

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PL, US, UR SUBJECT: IF SOLIDARITY TAKES CHARGE,

FLATLY RULED OUT ANY HAM-HANDED SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLISH AFFAIRS. BASED ON HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET OFFICIAL A ND UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIETS ESTIMATE THAT TAKING ON WALESA WILL ULTIMATELY CAUSE THEM MORE TROUBLE THAN TRYING TO WORK WITH HIM. ALEKSEY BUKALOV, AN OTVETSVENNIY SEKRETAR' (RESPONSIBLE SECRETARY) AT NOVOYE VREMYA AGREES, SAYING THAT MOSCOW WOULD REACT "SPOKOYNO" (CALMLY) TO A SOLIDARITY TAKEOVER. THERE WOULD BE NO OTHER CHOICE, NO MATTER HOW MUCH DISPLEASURE SUCH AN EVENT MIGHT CAUSE IN MOSCOW. IN ANY CASE, BUKALOV BELIEVES, WALESA WOULD BE TOO SMART TO PROVOKE A CONFRONTATION. HE WOULD BE SURE TO INCLUDE COMMUNISTS IN HIS CABINET, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HOLD ECONOMIC PORTFOLIOS.

ONE POLE'S PERSPECTIVE: IT CAN'T HAPPEN HERE

10. ON AUGUST 16, THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH OUTGOING CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 22357 03 OF 03 1617502

POLISH AMBASSADOR WLODZIMIERZ NATORF TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND (NATORF IS RETURNING TO WARSAW TO BECOME THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS). DURING THE DISCUSSION, AMBASSADOR NATORF EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT PEOPLE WHO FEAR A SHARP SOVIET REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND "ARE STILL THINKING IN THE CATEGORIES OF THE PAST -- THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE...OBSERVERS ARE CORRECT IN THE ASSUMPTION THAT IF THE SITUATION CHANGED (I.E., SOLIDARITY CAME TO POWER), THERE WOULD BE BIG PROBLEMS FOR ALL OF POLAND'S NEIGHBORS. HOWEVER, THE REACTION WOULD NOT BE THE SAME AS IN 1956 OR 1968." NATORF WENT ON TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT A WAY WOULD BE FOUND OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND THAT A SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT COME TO PASS. "THE ROUND TABLE AGREEMENT IS STILL VALID, AND EVEN IN A 'GRAND COALITION' OUR PARTY WILL STILL HAVE THE DECISIVE VOICE WITH REGARD TO RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBORS."

Page UNCLASSIFIED

4

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Date Printed: 08/26/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 89MOSCOW22357

CHANNEL: n/a

1237

COMMENT

11. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE POLISH POLITICAL CRISIS HAS THUS FAR BEEN RESTRAINED, AND BARRING A MAJOR MISSTEP BY SOLIDARITY IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. IN KEEPING WITH SOVIET "NEW THINKING" IN FOREIGN POLICY, A STRONG REACTION TO POLISH EVENTS DOES NOT SEEM TO BE APPROPRIATE. FOR MORE OLD-LINE THINKERS, THE PROSPECT OF A SOLIDARITY TAKEOVER IS NOT SOMETHING THEY ARE COMFORTABLE THINKING ABOUT, OR COMMENTING ON. MOST OF THE LATTER APPEAR TO BE HOLDING THEIR BREATH, OR AT LEAST THEIR RHETORIC, IN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

MOSCOW 22357 03 OF 03 161750Z

HOPES THAT SOMEHOW A SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND INTERNALLY THAT WILL ALLOW THE PZPR TO CONTINUE AS THE LEADING MEMBER OF THE NEXT COALITION GOVERNMENT. BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ALTHOUGH SOLIDARITY MAY BE A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW, OUR BEST GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO SO, IF IT COMES TO THAT, AFTER MUCH GAGGING AND GULPING. THEIR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS IN POLAND WILL BE SATISFIED BY ANY REGIME, SOLIDARITY-LED OR NOT, THAT CAN PROMOTE DOMESTIC STABILITY AND AVOID ANTI-SOVIET OUTBURSTS. MATLOCK